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ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION
This paper presents the capabilities implemented in the
SAX system for an efficient operations management
during its in-flight mission.
SAX is an Italian scientific satellite for X-ray Astronomy
whose major mission objectives impose quite tight
constraints on the implementation of both the space and
ground segment. The most relevant mission
characteristics require an operative lifetime of two years,
performing scientific observations both in contact and in
non-contact periods, with a low equatorial orbit
supported by one ground station, so that only a few
minutes of communication are available each orbit.
This operational scenario determines the need to have a
satellite capable of performing the scheduled mission
automatically and reacting autonomously to contingency
situations.
The implementation approach of the on-board operations
management, through which the necessary automation
and autonomy are achieved, follows a hierarchical
structure.
This has been achieved adopting a distributed avionic
architecture. Nine different on-board computers, in fact,
constitute the on-board data management system. Each
of them performs the local control and monitors its own
functions whilst the system level control is performed at
a higher level by the Data Handling Application
software.
The SAX on-board architecture provides the gr_nd
operators with different options of intervention by three
classes of telecommands. The management of the scientific
operations will be scheduled by the Operation Control Centre
via dedicated operating plans.
The SAX satellite flight model is presently being
integrated at Alenia Spazio premises in Turin for a
launch scheduled for end '95.
Once in orbit, the SAX satellite will be subject to
intensive check-out activities in order to verifiy the
required mission performances. An overview of the
envisaged procedure and of the necessary on-ground
activities is therefore depicted as well in this paper.
The SAX satellite is part of a scientific program whose
objective is to observe celestial X-ray sources in the
broad energy band from 0.1 KeV to 300 KeV. The SAX
mission has been planned to achieve a systematic,
integrated and comprehensive exploration of galactic and
extra-galactic sources, providing significative
improvements for more complete and extensive studies
in X-ray astrophysics.
SAX is a joint program managed by the Italian Space
Agency (ASI) and by the Netherlands Agency for
Aerospace Programs (NIVR) coordinating the scientific
interest of the Italian and Dutch scientific community
and funding an international industrial team whose
overall organization structure includes:
• Alenia Spazio as main contractor for the Space Segment
• Telespazio as main contractor for the Ground Segment
• Martin Marietta - Commercial Launch Services - as
main contractor for the Launch Vehicle
• Italian and Dutch Scientific Institutes as Scientific
Consultancy.
The SAX Payload hosted on-board consists of the following
six scientific Instruments (Ref. 1):
• Low Energy Concentrator Spectrometer (LECS) whose
task is to perform X-ray spectrometry/imaging in the
0.1-10 KeV energy range
• Medium Energy Concentrator Spectrometer (MECS)
whose task is to perform X-ray spectrometry/imaging in
the 1-10 KeV energy range
• High Pressure Gas Scintillation Proportional Counter
(HP-GSPC) whose task is to perform X-ray
spectrometry in the 3-120 KeV energy range
• Phoswich Detector System (PDS) whose task is to
perform X-ray spectrometry in the 15-300 KeV energy
range and gamma-ray burst monitoring in the 60-600
Kev energy range
• Two Wide Field Cameras (WFCs) whose task is to
perform X-ray spectrometry/imaging in the 2-30 KeV
energy range.
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Fig. 1 - Satellite Overall Configuration
The WFCs are mounted along the +Y and -Y satellite
axes, allowing an observation of a wide sky portion,
whereas all the other Narrow Field Instruments are
aligned along with the +Z axis. Fig. 1 illustrates the
satellite overall configuration.
The SAX pointing capability ensures a target
measurement accuracy of 1 arcmin and a pointing of 3
arcmin for a maximum of 105 seconds, i.e., one day.
All the project design has been developed to cope with a
mission of at least two years preceeded by a
commissioning phase period, estimated to extend for
about eight weeks.
The satellite is currently in a very advanced C/D phase.
The Flight Model is under integration as the last step of
a system integration and test campaign involving the
developing of a Structure Model, an Engineering Model,
and a Software Verification Facility. The launch will
take place by end '95 with an Atlas Centaur vehicle. The
SAX Ground Station will be located in Singapore and
will be connected via Intelsat to the SAX Operation
Control Center and the Scientific Data Center, both
located in Rome.
MISSION CHARACTERISTICS
The major constraint entailed by the scientific objectives
requires a satellite orbit such that the background particle
radiation for X-ray detection be very low and the effects
of radiation from the South Atlantic Anomaly region be
reduced. This leads to the choice of a circular low Earth
orbit at a 600 Km altitude - Begin of Life (450 End of
Life) - and an inclination of about 4*. The orbit period is
thus of 97 minutes with an alternance of 60 minutes of
sunlight and 37 minutes of eclipse.
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One single ground station, located near the equator, will
supp(xt the mission offering satellite visibility each orbit. The
coverage period is anyway no longer than 11 minutes so that
about 90% of orbital life is out of visibility.
The pointing domain is limited by the allowed sun
incident angle range on the satellite solar array surface.
A maximum of 30* (with occasional excursions to 45*)
inclination is allowed with respect to the sun direction to
ensure a proper battery charge. This implies a pointing
domain for the Narrow Field Instruments limited within
a band in the sky 60* wide available for observation each
orbit (except some possible occultations by celestial
bodies). In a one year period, the whole sky will be
observable for a scientific activity that can be estimated
as performing between 2000 and 3000 independent
observations (Ref. 2).
THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The above introduced operational scenario determines
the need to have implemented on-board the capability of
supporting, in an autonomous way, the execution of
on-ground pre-defined mission plans. That also requires
the on-board architecture to manage the nominal
activities as well as the pre-conceived anomalies, in all
the mission phases, taking into particular account that
most of the mission is out of the ground coverage.
The implementation approach of the required operation
management is based on an avionic architecture which
makes extensive use of a distributed on-board
intelligence (Ref. 3). Nine on-board intelligent terminals
constitute the SAX system architecture as shown in Fig.
2 (see following page).
Each of them performs the autonomous conlrol of the
relevant subsystem (S/S) local functions including the
surveillance of its health status. The control of the system
overall activity is assigned to a higher hierarchical level and
is implemented in a Central Terminal Unit (CTU). The CTU
is devoted to coordinating and controlling the Data
Management and Communication System as well as to
managing the system nominal operations and to undertaking
the system level recovery actions. A set of non-intelligent
subsystems, including the Telemetry Tracking & Command
S/S, the Reaction Control S/S and the Electrical Power S/S
are placed under the direct control of the CTU via serial lines
through a Remote Terminal Unit.
The interprocess communication is based on the ESA
standard serial digital bus arbitrated by the CTU and
composed of:
• Interrogation Bus for CTU to local terminals
interrogations
• Response bus for local terminals to CTU transmission of
Housekeeping Data (HKD)
• Block Transfer Bus for Scientific Instruments to CTU
Iransmission of Scientific Data.
: __ i_•
::?! !i!:•: i _
!_i;_ ,_
:_!_i i i: / ,
H
5
/!i:
L
H,/
_i_ , ?:/:,
iii:i:!_!ii:•
,il _ ::
'ii i_!!:!i_!:
!•
ii_i::ii
PDS
I t
'_ HP-GS
t i t
°, __
t_:..._..:; - _" "-I WFCl
_i_ _i_ty _ --1
_omrnan_ WFC2
,?'
MACS Bus
OBDH
Bus
i
Remo_
Term.
Unit
m
A_tu_
_on_o]
Switch-over compu
Command
jetom. Rec
I'
Fig. 2 - System Architecture
--I_,
, Commands
-'!_- '
ulta
_.--,
II
r!
The data communication protocol is designed to ensure a
collection of about 16 kbit/sec of HKD from the satellite
subsystems and science instruments and up to 100
kbit/sec of scientific data. Two different formats of HKD
can also be selected: one essential format including a
basic set of SAX HKD, one intensive format including
some extra information on hot redundant units and Data
Handling traced operations. All the data gathered in
non-visibility are temporarily stored on a dedicated tape
recorder, with a capacity of 510 Mbits, until requested to
be dumped to ground during the coverage periods. Two
channels are implemented to dump to ground the satellite
telemetry in High Bit Rate mode:
* channel 'T' for dumping the real-time collected
telemetry at 131 kbps
* channel "Q" for dumping the tape recorded data at 917
Kbps.
A 16 Kbps link is also available to implement a Low Bit
Rate transmission mode.
The telecommand bit rate allows an uploading of 2
Kbps, that is about 20 frame instructions/sec.
ON-BOARD REDUNDANCY CONCEPT
The SAX mission characteristics have led to a system
design with a high degree of reliability to cope with so
long an autonomous lifetime.
All the spacecraft S/Ss are designed to be single failure
tolerant whereas the Scientific Instruments implement
redundancy only at interface level. Critical on-board
items (e.g. receivers, decoders, gyroscopes, power units,
protected memory) all operate in hot redundancy. In this
context single spacecraft unit malfunction does not affect
the nominal mission performance.
The intelligent subsystems i.e., On-Board Data
Handling (OBDH), Attitude and Orbit Control S/S
(AOCS), Thermal Control S/S (TCS) - are based on a
fully redundant architecture. Each of their unit classes
includes one redundant item so that one fatal failure can
be recovered by properly activating this redundancy.
The Scientific Instruments, not having implemented any
internal redundancy, perform only a reduced Failure
Detection and Isolation function for specific problems.
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All the on-board computers maintain at least the software
(SW) basic functions stored in Programmable Read Only
Memories so that any reset/switch-over cannot cause the
loss of the code, as it is downloaded from PROM to
RAM any time a (re)-initialization takes place.
Embedded circuitry for error detection and correction of
corrupted memory cells by single event upset as well as
a watch-dog circuitry for autonomous reconfigurations
are provided in all the intelligent subsystems.
All the data considered critical for the proper on-board
autonomous maintenance of the mission, in any nominal
or contingency situation, are dynamically maintained in
dedicated Protected Memory Areas. According to the
relevant OBDH and AOCS performed control, this data
set is so classified and grouped:
* OBDH Application SW (A/SW) vital data, including the
Solar Array deployment status, the launcher separation
status, the system and some critical S/S items active
configuration (e.g. transmitters, battery discharge
regulators, reaction control S/S branches, etc.)
® OBDH Basic SW (B/SW) vital data, including the
launcher separation status, the OBDH active unit
configuration, the redundancy management data
- Time Tagged commands to be scheduled at their own
pre-set time
o Real Time commands to be executed at CTU
switch-over
* AOCS S/S active configuration and launcher separation
status, maintained in dedicated AOCS solid state latches.
The failure management of non-intelligent S/Ss is
performed at centralized level by the OBDH A/SW.
Some exceptions deviate from this general approach:
* Power S/S performs the failure management for its own
units;
* the hydrazine flow control valves are under control of
the AOCS when it makes use of thrusters:
and these are driven by time intervention constraints.
MISSION PHASES
The SAX mission can be divided into four overall
mission phases.
• Launch Phase
LP begins at spacecraft power-on just before vehicle
lift-off and extends to the physical separation between
the launcher and SAX. In this phase the S/Ss are
initialized and perform a continuous control of the
powered units. No attitude manoeuvre is of course
executed as the AOCS is in its initialization mode
until the separation. The on-board produced data are
stored on the tape recorder, just after the launch
vibrations terminate, for later transmission to ground.
The system mode design has been structured to cope
with all the SAX mission phases (Ref. 4). The satellite
modes - implemented with a direct correspondence with
the AOCS modes - drive all the on-board autonomous
operations. Their transitions can be initiated either upon
ground commands or at the occurrence of automatic
fallbacks caused by system autonomous emergency
re-configurations. The SAX mode transitions diagram is
reported in Fig. 3 (see following page).
The mission/science support modes are the principle
configuration to support the scientific activity. The
default/safety modes correspond to the main operative
configurations to be assumed in case of interim science
activity or on-board emergency. Two further modes
support special operations during the launch phase and
during the orbit raising manoeuvre - if ever needed.
• Satellite Launch Mode (SLM)
Routine operations are performed to ensure an health
satellite status ready to operate just after the
SAX-launcher separation.
• Commissioning Phase
This begins at the SAX-launcher separation and
extends to the completion of all initial in-orbit tests
and calibrations. As a first step, it consists of an Early
Orbit Phase which comprises a short post separation
coast period, a reduction of any residual S/L body
rates and a subsequent Sun/Earth acquisition period.
Upon successful completion of these activities the
deployment of the Solar Arrays is autonomously
operated.
The commissioning of the satellite shall proceed with
an initial health check-out continuing with systematic
functional checks of all the subsystem nominal
functionalities.
The Scientific Instrument activation and functional
verification shall be operated as a last step. Some
overlaps between the two shall be necessary for a
complementary check-out of both the spacecraft and
the Scientific Instruments. All these operations shall
be initiated by ground and supported by the on-board
SW tasks.
• Operational Orbit Phase
This phase covers the period of the satellite's useful
scientific lifetime. It shall be nominally two years and
shall be characterized by routine scientific operations.
The satellite design shall, anyway, allow an extention
of the mission beyond the nominal period up to a total
four years lifetime.
• End of L_'e Phase
This phase covers the period when SAX is no longer
capable of producing useful scientific information due
to either component degradation or altitude decay.
SATELLITE MODES
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The produced telemetry is recorded only after the
vibration level is reduced - the activation of the
on-board tape recorder is made by a time tagged
command.
Satellite Sun Earth Pointing Mode (SSEPM)
This mode is automatically entered either at
SAX-launcher separation or as fall-back from the other
Nominal Satellite modes. Purpose of this mode is to
maintain the satellite in a 3-axis stabilized attitude
optimizing the san incidence on the Solar Arrays. As
this mode is entered from the separation, it has to
accomplish a very critical sequence of operations most
of them to be performed autonomously since they are
out of the ground coverage. The major operations are
initiated by the OBDH and AOCS software that have to
coordinate the safe attitude acquisition with the Solar
Arrays deployment. Trigger of these operations is the
SAX-launcher separation, detected by a dedicated fully
redundant hardware circuitry and sent to both the S/Ss.
,, Satellite Interim Science Mode (SISM)
This mode configures the SAX satellitein a accurate
three-axes stabilized attitude making use of one star
tracker, besides all the other used sensors. This fine
pointing helps in keeping a default attitude (e.g.
Polaris pointing) and in fastening attitude transitions
to scientific modes.
• Satellite Nominal Science Mode (SNSM)
The satellite remains in this mode while operating the
planned scientific observations. A very fine pointing
is made by use of the AOCS star trackers. All the
scientific data produced by the Scientific Instruments
are collected by the OBDH according to a dedicated
polling algorithm.
• Satellite Slow Scan Mode (SSSM)
This mode will mainly be used to perform calibrations
of Non-Imaging Scientific Instruments by performing
sequential slews across a known target.
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* Satellite Delta-V Mode (SDVM)
This mode is designed to cope with the altitude decay,
raising the satellite orbit in the case the SAX altitude
decreases below the 450 Km.
* Satellite Safe Mode (SSM)
This mode is entered upon detection of specific
system-level failures. A safe attitude is then maintained
by the AOCS pointing the Solar Army surfaces toward
the sun and aligning the satellite with the earth magnetic
field.
OPERATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
The management of the SAX system operating modes is
implemented by a multi-level hierarchical structure (Ref.
5) involving, in increasing priority:
* the S/L Subsystems and Scientific Instruments
* the OBDH Application Software
* the Ground Operation Control Centre.
To the upper levels is assigned the task of initiating the
scheduling of system level functions as well as the
capability of controlling and overriding the lower level
decisions. On the other hand, the main nominal
operations autonomously performed at local level allow
the proper control and setting of the relevant S/S. In
particular, the intelligent terminals and Scientific
Instruments are designed to be fully autonomous in
performing their relevant tasks so that they can in
principle continue operating consistently without any
external intervention. Few inputs are, in fact, needed
only for tuning their performances and their
configurations with respect to either the system
configuration or the current mission characteristics.
Each of the intelligent subsystems also performs a
Failure Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR)
management on its own, keeping under control the
configuration, functioning and health status of all its
relevant units. In the case a malfunction is detected, the
fault unit can be substituted by the redundant one. If the
main S/S computer is affected an automatic switch-over
takes place. The redundant intelligent unit will then be
initialized assuming a safe mode of functioning.
The Scientific Instruments, not having a redundant
architecture, adopt a self disabling policy, in particular,
against a too high level of particle radiation able to
damage the instrument itself.
Purpose of the OBDH A/SW is to keep under control all
the subsystem level operations; that implies a system
supervision to ensure the proper nominal/safety satellite
consistency. What has been assigned to the A/SW is the
role of the on-board coordinator of all the major flight
operations between themselves and with respect to the
ground scheduled plans.
It is in particular devoted to:
* perform Solar Array deployment following the launcher
separation and sun/earth acquisition
* inform the AOCS of the new inertia matrix to be used
after the Solar Array deployment
* support the distribution and enabling of operating plans
to the AOCS and Scientific Instruments
* support the Ground-to-Satellite link acquisition and
downlink telemetry operations
* enable/disable power resources to the non-essential
satellite loads, i.e., Scientific Instruments, Reaction
Control S/S, thermal control heaters
* perform the deployment of the Scientific Instrument
baffles
* manage satellite mode transitions as a consequence of
* Intelligent S/S switch-over
* AOCS mode fallbacks
* Power S/S protection triggering
* Scientific Instrument particle over-radiation detection.
All the A/SW operations are coordinated and
synchronized by the proper activation of dedicated
pre-defined command sequences and command loops.
These can be activated either by ground or autonomously
to accomplish the above introduced operation set. The
OBDH A/SW core is based on three principal modules
acting as the kernel of the A/SW architecture, as
illustrated in Fig. 4 (following page).
The Mission Manager" it monitors the mode lransitions
of all the subsystems and instruments which require
corrective operations. It is based on a mode transition
table indicating all the actions to be undertaken at the
occurrence of S/S mode Iransitions. It in particular
specifies the safe configurations to be adopted in case of
some critical mode fall-backs. It also drives the
enabling/disabling statuses to be applied to the A/SW
controls, as a function of the satellite mode
configuration.
The Fault Manager: it cyclically checks a pre-defined
sub-set of the on-board produced monitors to undertake
subsequent actions to isolate and/or recover the related
problems. The data set includes all the mission critical
on-board items, provided on a periodic basis and kept
under control by means of a table driven FDIR manager.
The control is performed by periodic tasks scheduled
every second.
A cross-check is then made between the measured
values and their relevant expected ranges. Any
discrepancy activates a direct recovery action on the
non-intelligent S/S with possible extension to a system
reconfiguration in the case the malfunction can severely
affect the system performance.
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Fig. 4 - OBDH Application Software Architecture
* The Telecommand Server: it manages the ground
initiated operations distributing and verifying the
command execution.
It furthermore applies a consistency checks on the
ground up-loaded requests against the current system
configuration. In the case a conflict is detected a report
is provided in the A/SW telemetry but no action is
undertaken until an explicit ground override is operated.
The top level of the SAX operations is, of course, a
ground task. It is responsible for acting on the satellite
configuration in order to set it up properly to accomplish
the planned scientific observations. It has therefore to
operate on both the spacecraft and the Scientific
Instruments. Besides, routine maintenance operations
have to be scheduled to cope with the orbit and mission
events/constraints.
Some of the more frequent operations are anyway related
to the orbit contact management whose ground
intervention extends to:
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* linking acquisition via the proper activation of the
transmitter linked to the ground facing antenna. This is
done by a time tagged telecommand acting on a
dedicated A/SW command sequence which is devoted to
verifying the correct functioning of the on-board link
chain
, enabling the telemetry transmission to ground once the
down-link carrier is obtained. This concems the
real-time telemetry and, on request, the on-tape data
stored in the non-coverage period
* restoring the on-board data recording and termination of
the link before the end of the contact period
* command the issuing of the on-board time samples for
on-ground data correlation
* managing the antennae switch-over as the coverage
concerning the facing antenna is going to end. Note that
two hemispherical antennae are implemented on SAX in
order to cover the whole space around the satellite.
Less frequent operations are related to scientific
observation management. That involves:
* changes of the satellite attitude via dedicated AOCS
Operating Plans
* changes of allowed pointing domains
* changes of Scientific Instrument operating modes
* Scientific Instrument configuration management, in
particular at any entry/exit of the South Atlantic
Anomaly.
Other infrequent operations are related to performance or
maintenance aspects. In this context, the ground control
centre shall periodically monitor the satellite dumped
telemetry to keep under control the actual on-board
configuration. It can therefore intervene for recovering
any on-board assumed safe mode or, simply, for tuning
some control parameters such as, for example, battery
End Of Charge and/or End Of Discharge levels, thermal
loop thresholds and/or enabling/disabling flags, sun
vector and attitude quaternion values, etc..
GROUND COMMANDING CAPABILITY
The ground commanding capability is driven by three
major parameters:
* the visibility period
* the up-link characteristics
• the on-board command management design &
operations.
The major constraint on the commanding capability
comes from the very limited visibility window. This
requires the Operation Control Centre to prepare a
well-defined timeline for a long period, e.g. one week -
corresponding to about one hundred passages, operating
in the interin of two passages just to analyze the dumped
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telemetry and to react to any anomaly detected. All the
commands necessary for operating the satellite both in
and out of visibility must be up-loaded during the
contact period.
The up-link characteristics are based on the ESA PCM
Telecommand Standard. It allows the transmission of
2000 bps, that is - as the ESA standard telecommand
frame is 96 bits long - a bit more than 20 frames/second.
The minimum instruction can be based on a single frame
structure. In the case a complex command is needed, a
mutiframe message - constituting a block command - can
be up-loaded. The block command structure used on
SAX is shown in Fig. 5.
Based on the above mentioned standard, the on-board
design provides ground with three different options of
intervention. Three classes of commands are, in fact,
made available and properly managed on board.
* Single frame commands that can be used to up-load high
priority command whose purpose is to operate on a
critical subset of the satellite hardware devices. This type
of commands by-passes any on-board SW control and,
via the decoder, directly acts on the end items. This class
is thus useful as a back-up in case of an emergency.
Typical applications are switching operations involving,
for example, unit selection and separation event override
command to AOCS.
. Single frame commands that can be used to directly
issue single instructions on the OBDH Bus to any
terminal. This class might be used only in the case of
OBDH B/SW bus management malfunction since they
by-pass the OBDH B/SW control. Care might therefore
be taken because such asynchronous instructions can
affect the proper OBDH Bus protocol functioning.
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• Block commands that represent the nominal way of
commanding. Their structure can be flexibly filled in so
that they can contain either one multi-parameter
command or a set of single instructions or one operating
plan. Their routing is performed by the OBDH B/SW
according to the destination field content. Other
syntactic/semantic information is contained in the block
header for on-board verification and execution, i.e.,
begin pattern, destination, name and length.
What is particularly important to emphasize is the
on-board capability of managing the block commands as
delayed commands. By means of a dedicated flag,
ground can, in fact, impose their execution at the time
specified in the relevant tag field. A queue of one
hundred time tagged commands is dedicated in the
OBDH protected memory area.- an estimation of about
60 block commands, as a maximum, has been evaluated
as necessary each orbit for nominal spacecraft and
Scientific Instrument operations. It is worthwhile noting
that a dedicated flag is also present in the block structure
indicating whether the command has to be deleted in
case of CTU switch-over. Since a system reconfiguration
takes place at the CTU switch-over, this option is quite
useful to avoid any unwanted override unless not
explicitly authorized by ground. The mission critical
commands, e.g. Transmitter ON command, should,
anyway, always remain in the queue until their
scheduling time elapses.
Within these commanding possibilities ground can
address specific requests to any on-board subsystem
coordinating the mission operations both in and out of
visibility.
One of the major aspects offered by the OBDH A/SW
design is the capability of modifying the OBDH A/SW
control, devoted to the system operations, by means of
simple enabling/disabling commands. As the most
important A/SW functions are implemented by a table
driven mechanism, a flag has been associated to each of
the table entries.
The relevant control can be made active or inhibited by
setting the proper value of these flags. An easy updating
of the table elements, used as comparison for activating
autonomous recovery actions, can be, as well, easily
done by mean of dedicated commands.
One of the more powerful features that are made
available for emergency ground intervention is specific
command to the OBDH operating system. The OBDH
SW - in particular the A/SW - is based on a very
modular architecture so that each command loop and
sequence has been implemented as a stand alone task.
Therefore, proper acting on the operating system
primitives can modify the task scheduling mechanism.
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In particular, the following main interventions can be
run-time commanded:
* change the task priority
* init/stargstop tasks
* send/receive messages on mailboxes.
This mainly allows the introduction of a new task
implementing new functionalities or replacing the current
ones.
The lowest level of possible intervention by ground is
the patching of the Intelligent Terminal software. It can
be accomplished through the OBDH support which
either autonomously executes the patch command on
itself, if so addressed, or routes the new data/instructions
towards the relevant Intelligent Terminal via the OBDH
Bus protocol. The same can be done by directly sending
patching commands to the AOCS and the LECS which
implement the capabilities of executing the patching by
themselves. This avoids putting the microprocessors in
wait state until the patch is terminated.
Both the interventions on the operating system and the
code have anyway to be planned very carefully with the
support of a Software Maintenance Facility whose team
shall have a very thorough expertise.
As far as the telemetry commanding capability is
concerned, two major features are provided on SAX.
The first one concerns the housekeeping data
transmission to ground whose format can be selected
between two:
* one essential format corresponding to the produced data
set from all the subsystems
* one intensive format that, besides the previous set,
includes extra data packets from the hot redundant
battery control unit and the B/SW tracing process.
The second is devoted to driving the scientific data
collection algorithm. The algorithm, once the scientific
activity is enabled, is executed every second, polling the
six scientific instruments to get the number of ready
scientific packets. The share of the successive scheduled
acquisitions between the instruments is based on two
ground configurable allocation tables, each of their
entries indicating one, out of six, instrument address.
Adjustment of the content of the two tables can be done
by ground according to each Scientific Instrument data
production forecast. Two dedicated commands are
available for this purpose.
Last but not least, extra data can be required by ground,
dumping both the code and the data segments of each
Intelligent Terminal for diagnostic purposes. That in
particular allows to obtain some memory areas of the
Intelligent Terminals devoted to storing history or trace
records not included in the periodic provided telemetry.
OPERATING PLANS
Setting the AOCS and Scientific Instrument
configurations and modes usually requires many
commands. This can overload both the time tagged
command queue and the related scanning process. A
solution to this potential problem has been found in
grouping a consistent set of commands into only one
Operating Plan.
Two types of plans are, in particular, implemented on
SAX:
* AOP . Attitude Operating Plans devoled to
commanding the mode transitions of the AOCS and to
controlling the attitude manoeuvres within the f'me
pointing modes
• POP. Payload Operating Plans - devoted to setting-up
the instrument configuration and the data output formats
for the required scientific performance.
These plans can be up-loaded encapsulated into one
command block and then stored in a dedicated Parcking
Memory Area. Their activation is requested by ground
via the associated Transfer and Enable Commands,
either in real-time or delayed with proper time tags. The
actual execution, by the destination terminal, shall follow
the correct reception and validation of the incoming
Operating Plan only once the Enable command is
received. Supervision of the whole consistency of this
transfer/enabling process is centralized and
autonomously made by the OBDH A/SW. It is, in fact,
in charge, if enabled, of filtering the Transfer and Enable
commands if not consistent with the satellite
mode/configuration, e.g. in the case of Safe Mode
fall-back.
As far as the safe AOCS modes are concerned no AOP
are, anyway, needed since the related attitudes are
autonomously acquired and indefinitely kept.
COMMISSIONING CHECK-OUT
The in-flight verification of SAX will be performed in a
designated eigth week Commissioning Phase following
its launch and separation from the launch vehicle.
The purpose of the Commissioning Phase is to validate
the functionality and operability of the satellite and give
the go-ahead to the scientific mission. The relevant
check-out activity is comprised of two principal
sub-phases.
Phase I involves the basic functional/ performance
verification of each of the spacecraft subsystems.
Phase II complements Phase I by extending the verification
to all the Scientific Instruments and completing the
verification of the fully active system configuration.
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A summaryof theplannedactivitiesincludes:
• Mode Functionality Verification
All nominal modes shall be verified for functionality,
valid telemetry parameters and expected ranges with
respect to the inherent functions of each mode.
• Commanded Mode Transitions
All nominal mode transitions requiring an uplinked
procedure from Ground will be performed and
verified. Certain transitions will be omitted for
specific re_ons, e.g. Delta-V mode transitions.
• Autonomous Mode Transitions
Verifications of autonomous fall-backs will not be
performed as they require fault conditions forced by
ground.
• Cyclic and Selectable Telemetry Verification
All the cyclically generated telemetry will be verified
for correct protocol handling, telemetry block
structures, parameter location and consistent time and
block counter fields. Variable telemetry activated by
ground will be verified as well, e.g. dumped data and
scientific packets.
• On-board Memory Patch and Dump
Dump operations will be required to evaluate control
parameters not visible in regular telemetry, e.g. AOCS
database, history areas, etc. Patches of program or
data memories are not a nominal activity but could
sometimes be necessary for table item updating, e.g.
LECS Instrument. A dump should always be required
after a patch operation.
• Control Function Calibrations
Calibrations or maintenance are required to optimize
the overall performance of both the Scientific
Instruments and the Subsystems, e.g. thermal control
loops thresholds, Instrument digital and analogue
discriminator levels, etc..
• Redundant Unit Check-out
Under nominal operations all operative redundant
units will be verified for correct functionalities, e.g.
gyros, decoders, receivers, etc.. Cold redundant units
will not be activated or verified unless necessary
because of failures. It is considered more prudent to
maintain a good nominal configuration rather than
risk possible failure in activating the redundant one.
CONCLUSIONS
The SAX satellite is the result of a quite challenging mission
requirement implementation.
Once in orbit it will support the extensive activity of six
complex Scientific Instruments performing parallel X-ray
observations.
The system design is based on a distributed intelligent
architecture allocating to each of the on-board computers
its own specific function. This has been designed to
provide the maximum flexibility and reliability in
autonomously executing the ground mission plans. The
SAX implementation of the operating modes, in fact,
allows the on-board configuration to be maintained by
itself, supporting, at the same time, the ground required
operations.
To conclude, the SAX mission will not only provide the
most up-to-date results in the field of X-ray astrophysics,
but it will also make operative a very powerful system
that is the product of Italian scientific satellite
engineering.
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